States are dangerous, even minarchist ones. Nevertheless, there are reasons why a seastead community might seek to organize as a minarchy rather than an anarchy in order to have a governmental face to turn toward the outside world.  Such a minarchy will need to be designed with incentive structures to counteract, as far as possible, the tendency of state power to grow.  Several strategies for doing so, both democratic and anti-democratic, are considered and found wanting.  It is argued that the best way of constraining a minarchist state is to build competitive, anarchic elements into its structure; several ways of doing this are canvassed.


The Author

Roderick T. Long (Harvard, A.B. 1985; Cornell, Ph.D. 1992) is Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University, President of the Molinari Institute, Senior Fellow at the Center for a Stateless Society, editor of The Industrial Radical and Molinari Review, and co-editor of the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies. He has also taught philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the University of Michigan. He publishes in the areas of Greek philosophy, ethics, social and political philosophy (with an emphasis on libertarian and anarchist thought), philosophy of social science, and philosophy of science fiction. He blogs at Austro-Athenian Empire (aaeblog.com) and Bleeding Heart Libertarians (bleedingheartlibertarians.com).



Roderick T. Long: Minarchism on Seasteads, in: Victor Tiberius (Ed.): Seasteads. Opportunities and Challenges for Small New Societies, Zurich (vdf), pp. 91-104.